We appreciate Elizabeth Bates' (B hereinafter) lengthy and critical review of our book, and we are grateful for this opportunity to reply. Our response will be in part concessionary and in part clarificatory, but there will remain a substantial area of disagreement, where we think that the evidence supports our original position on the status of linguistic knowledge and its implications.
When we turn to wider issues it appears that much of the disagreement between Bates and us, or between connectionists and generativists more generally, centres on our understanding of 'language' in general and our exploitation of Universal Grammar (UG) in Chomsky's sense in particular. We are reprimanded for not making it explicit that UG is not universally accepted by the linguistic and psycho-linguistic communities, and that it may even be wrong. We take the possibility of being wrong in this fashion as axiomatic: as part of the scientific enterprise. In fact we are sure that current views of UG are wrong, but we are equally sure that they constitute the best characterisation of 'knowledge of language' that is currently available, and so we shall continue to exploit them until better alternatives appear. We hardly thought such things needed saying.
Let us provide a positive example of where the interaction of generativists and connectionists might bear fruit. It seems to us that (connectionist) neural nets are an excellent tool for testing the force of Poverty of the Stimulus arguments. That is, we concede that appeals to the poverty of the stimulus are sometimes made in the absence of detailed analyses of precisely how much information can in fact be gleaned from the input. An obvious way of providing evidence in this domain is by devising connectionist models that can and do learn the behaviour specified. While promising, such models are in general still too primitive to be linguistically useful, and we remain convinced that argumentation from the poverty of the stimulus is still valid, and that the balance of evidence is still in favour of assigning a crucial role to UG.
A simple reason for our preference for UG and our corresponding scepticism about the insight provided by connectionist models is given by our Epun experiment. In this part of our investigations we attempted to teach Christopher and a small group of controls an invented language which differed from normal languages (inter alia) in allowing structure independent operations; specifically, the emphatic form of sentences was produced by adding an affix to the third orthographic word of the sentence. Such a process is predicted by the principle of UG known as 'structure dependence' to be universally impossible. That is, no process in any language can 'count' in this fashion. Predictably, both Christopher and the controls failed to master what is conceptually an extremely simple operation. Interestingly, we are assured that connectionist networks would have no difficulty in learning such a 'rule'. This seems to us to be a serious defect of such networks, and simultaneously to provide striking support for the UG principle involved. It is of course possible to tweak a network in such a way that it is unable to learn the rule involved, but such tweaking is tantamount to building in 'innate' structure of the kind B repudiates.
It is perhaps worth elaborating on the nature of linguistic, and especially syntactic, universals, as B's conception of them is somewhat naive. In arguing against our appeal to a language module, B draws an analogy (p.8) between ability in language and the ability of an individual with mental retardation to "recognise every make and model of American car". She then compares the existence of language universals with the universality of the use of the hand to eat (p.9): attributable to the fact that this is "the simplest and most efficient solution to the problem". These analogies strike us as being either ingenuous or disingenuous. The complexity of our knowledge of language is (uncontroversially) orders of magnitude greater than the complexity of hand to mouth coordination. It is probably even more complex than the other analogy B provides: to visual perception. Logically, of course, it "may be true" that multi-layered neural networks can "find the solution in the absence of innate knowledge" (p.9), but for language there is minimal evidence of this in the literature. Discussions of language in e.g. Elman (1993) , Elman et al (1996) , etc. are strikingly coy about anything more complex than semi-grammatical 'subject verb (object)' sentences without functional categories. A major achievement of 40 years work in generative grammar is the formal characterisation of knowledge of a vast array of complex syntactic facts. Our possession of some of this knowledge is resistant to explanation in terms of traditional learning theory, and hence provides evidence for an alternative account, such as the one we provide. It is also compatible with an indefinitely large number of other accounts, as is the case throughout science, but UG --whatever its limitations --is the most fully worked out account available, and promissory notes are an inadequate substitute.
There are also definitional questions involved. Our use of the terms 'grammar' and 'language' is, we suspect, much more restricted than Bates'. She has a Jakobsonian conception in which 'language' refers to everything that can be expressed by language, whereas our view of the language module excludes encyclopaedic knowledge, sociolinguistic subtleties, and so on, and is limited to properties of the morpho-syntax (and phonology); that is to the set of universal principles and parametric choices that characterise core grammar. This is relevant to B's criticism of our claim about cognitive prerequisites to language acquisition. The fact that Christopher has a mental age of five or greater, plenty of time, and an obsession with language does not guarantee that these formal properties of natural language are accessible to him at all, still less that they are learnable. He has achieved nearperfect mastery of the grammar of his native language, but if unlimited time and attention were all that was necessary we would expect Christopher to be near-perfect in his mastery of the grammar of other non-native languages as well. In fact Christopher's preoccupation with linguistic form in languages other than English has always been a salient characteristic of his behaviour, so we should expect him to be (near) native-like in languages like French, German and Greek, given that all the requirements of mental age, time, determination and close attention are fulfilled. As is made clear in our book, Christopher's second language learning, while scintillating in some areas: the lexicon and morphology; in others (especially syntax) it is slow, laborious and inefficient.
There are other instances where B's account is simplistic or misleading. She entertains the possibility that "UG is not innate in any form" (p.10), but earlier admits that the emergence of modular architecture "must be constrained by innate biases of some kind" (p.6). It is clear that knowledge of language develops similarly across the species. It is equally clear that much of that knowledge is indeed the product of development in that it is not present at birth. No-one knows how that knowledge is neurologically specified or how any blue-print for language might be encoded. We are accordingly agnostic about which aspects of our knowledge are represented as 'knowledge' ab initio, and which aspects are a function of maturational development. As Fodor (forthcoming) puts it "Perhaps there are no innate ideas". Let us spell this out a little more.
We do not believe in a single 'gene for grammar', but we do believe that the human capacity for language is genetically determined. Consider an analogy: in Fragile X Syndrome shutting off one gene on the X chromosome gives rise to skin abnormalities, heart defects, macro-orchidism and a range of other defects. Exactly what the protein made by the FMR-1 gene does in the brain is not known, but no-one doubts that the disorder is genetically controlled and transmitted. This of course raises the possibility that language (and language disorders) are necessarily associated with other abilities (and disabilities): maybe language impairment goes with cognitive impairment just as heart defects go with macro-orchidism. Here, however, it is precisely the dissociations that we attempted to document that provide evidence for there being some genetic specialisation for linguistic properties. It is perhaps relevant to mention here the work of Gopnik and her colleagues (e.g. Gopnik, 1990 Gopnik, , 1997 Gopnik & Goad, in press) which B, echoing Vargha-Khadem et al (1995) criticises (p.14). There is no doubt that in the case of the K family the disability is genetically caused. What is contested is whether the disability is specific to language or is more general, with reflexes in both language and other domains. The model of fragile X would lead us to expect that any genetic defect would have a range of physical manifestations, as appears to be the case with many of the members of the K family. Remarkably, however, there appear to be instances where everything other than language is indeed spared, showing precisely the kind of dissociation predicted. Even here, it would be unwise to postulate a one to one relation between gene and grammar, but what is important is the genetic determination for language. In Christopher's case there is no evidence for a genetic basis for his condition, but there is evidence of the same kind of dissociation, leading us to propose the general model of human abilities sketched out later.
That a basic area of disagreement between B and us resides in our choice of theory is clear. But we suspect that B has not really understood the theory we do use. This is most obvious in the discussion of universals. We are accused of using a notion of 'universal' that is immune from empirical disconfirmation (p.12) for three different reasons, none of which we find convincing.
The first is that we use binary disjunctive choices (such as that languages will be either 'Null Subject' or not) which "exhaust the set of logical possibilities, and cannot be disproven". We do not view the identification of a major structural partition of the world's languages as vacuous in the way that B appears to. But what is important in this as in other cases is explanatory potential. The Null Subject parameter is the basis for making predictions about the clustering of properties in different languages. The beauty of the initial claim was that knowing that an adult language allowed empty subjects enabled one to predict that it would also have other properties (inverted subjects, thattrace effects, and so on). Correspondingly, the child's task in acquiring its first language was eased in that learning any one of these facts brought with it unlearned knowledge of the others. In this particular instance the prediction was not as simple as had been hoped: the properties fractionate (as we mentioned on p.92 of our book) with some 'null-subject' languages not having the expected further properties. There are two possible interpretations of this fact. The first is that we have not analysed the constellation of properties associated with the null-subject parameter appropriately and so need to re-examine large amounts of data until ultimately we come up with a refined, successful, version. The second is that the hypothesis has been refuted. In this instance we suspect that this latter position is indeed the case. But if so, then the claim that our theory is insulated from refutation is simply false. Virtually any working (generative) linguist knows only too well that his or her hypotheses are likely to be refuted at the very next conference.
The second reason for rejecting our notion of universal was that we postulate "invisible entities with no causal consequences" (p.12). It is true that, along with much of the generative community, we allow invisible entities. It is false that they have no causal consequences. We cite just two examples: wanna-contraction and Chinese morphology. The difference in some dialects between the ambiguous "Teddy is the man I want to succeed" and the univocal "Teddy is the man I wanna succeed" is attributed to the presence of an empty category between the want and the to on one reading of the former but not the other. One may or may not find this explanation cogent, but it rests crucially on the assumption that invisible entities have causal effects. The example Bates cites is the lack of inflectional morphology in Chinese and the claim that the abstract representation of inflectional categories is universal. Here too we think that there are indeed causal consequences. For example, the distinction between finite and non-finite clauses is marked in Chinese through the use of aspectual particles. The consequences of this finite/non-finite distinction are relevant to syntactic phenomena of control and reference assignment with empty and overt subjects (see e.g. Martohardjono & Flynn, 1995) . That is, the universality of abstract features can be vindicated in any language if these features are crucial for the syntactico-semantic representation of the sentence. Overt morphology realised on these features is one of the possible indications of their existence in clause structure, but not the only one. A related misunderstanding is apparent in B's discussion of Epun. She claims (p.16) that Christopher's performance on Epun past tense structures is an exception to our generalisation that he is better at morphology and worse at syntax. But there are two aspects to past-tense formation in Epun: a morphological one (attach ha-to the verbal stem) and a syntactic one (prepose the object to sentence-initial position). Christopher mastered the first, morphological, part of the rule, but not the second, syntactic, part.
The third reason for dismissing our view of universals is based on an analytical misunderstanding. B claims that English allows null subjects under particular discourse conditions, as in "Got it, thanks" (p.12). Unfortunately, such examples are not instances of pro-drop: there is an ellipsed auxiliary verb as well in such sentences (cf. "I've got it, thanks") and, as Haegeman (1990) has demonstrated, they have a range of different properties. Similarly, having recourse to Gold's theorem (p.9) in an attempt to undercut poverty of the stimulus arguments is misconceived: nothing in Chomsky's work of the last quarter century depends on Gold's finding. As mentioned above, we agree that poverty of the stimulus arguments are in need of refinement, but the point of departure is hardly Gold.
We would like to finish by responding to a number of unrelated points. In discussing Christopher's learning of Berber (an Afro-Asiatic, not an 'Arabic' language), we said that he could "register pairings of morphological form and semantic content on minimal exposure" (p.83, cited here on p.15), and B justifiably would like some definition of 'minimal exposure'. First we need to point out that Christopher does not spend "most of his waking hours working on the learning of foreign languages". He spends most of his waking hours digging in the garden, working in the carding shop, reading newspapers, listening to music and indulging in a variety of other occupations (he has a remarkable general knowledge). When he started learning Berber, we spent about an hour going through various aspects of Berber grammar with him both visually and aurally, at which stage he was already identifying patterns in the complex morphology. At the end of the 'lesson' we left material with him to work on before our next visit a month later. When we asked him on this latter occasion how long he had spent on the Berber (which he remembered excellently) he responded 'about an hour'. This estimate was confirmed by the director of the home where Christopher lives, but it is impossible to know how much time he mulls over things in his mind, and what he does in the privacy of his own room. Accordingly, we chose the deliberately imprecise term given.
As regards the implication of this part of the experiment, it is worth noting that we agree with B's observation that the "attributes that are C's greatest gift are not part of UG in the strict sense" (p.15). It was precisely the dissociation in his various different linguistic abilities that prompted us to develop our 'hybrid model (p.18) based on Anderson's (1992) theory of intelligence. We don't think this model has weakened the UG-based position we advocate; rather, we think that it is sufficiently specific to make falsifiable predictions about language processing. Indeed, we are afraid that it is not only falsifiable but false: a state of affairs about which we should presumably feel both shame and pride.
We return to the vexed question of (alternatives to) UG. Our immediate problem is identifying 'non-UG' alternatives that deal with the range of facts we have documented. We know of none. Our second problem is with B's claim that "C is relatively weak at syntax, and falls back on L1 and L2 transfer, because the syntactic dimensions at issue (e.g. that-trace, coreference phenomena, highly marked word orders) occur less frequently in the input, and because they are governed by subtle discourse constraints and pragmatic inferences" (p.18). The word-orders that Christopher fails to master are not always highly marked: they are certainly not as marked or as rare as parasitic gap constructions, on which his responses are normal. For example, postverbal subjects in null subject languages such as Greek and Italian are completely unmarked and are abundant in both the spoken and written languages. In German, word-order is fairly rigid, especially insofar as this concerns V2 effects in matrix (but not embedded) clauses, and appears to have little correlation with discourse properties. Pragmatic factors and frequency of occurrence, whether type or token, are not at issue: there is no other choice. As discussed in our book, Christopher has trouble with both these kinds of example. The syntactic problems he exhibits with word-orders different from English, but frequent and sometimes obligatory in the L2, are not amenable to a discourse/pragmatic or frequency explanation given that in such cases his performance in the native language is perfect.
Finally we agree that we have not done 'justice' (p.1) to Christopher. We wish we could say more about him "as a human being" (p.19), but his internal thought processes remain largely an enigma, and we fear that he is not likely to give us the kind of self-portrait that more gifted autistic subjects such as Donna Williams (1992 Williams ( , 1994 and Temple Grandin (1986) have provided. We do know that learning languages gives him pleasure, even joy; that his position in the community is enhanced by his abilities and by our attention to them. He has given us comparable pleasure and immeasurable intellectual stimulation. We hope that some of that gain has been passed on to the wider linguistic community, whatever the differences in interpretation that are put upon the data and our analyses of them.
